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Abstract
Small economies rarely embrace free trade, a fact that is commonly explained as a consequence of the
government's use of trade policy to redistribute income. But why is this redistribution typically biased in
favor of import-competing sectors and is consequently trade restricting rather than trade promoting? This
remains an important puzzle in trade policy. Most models assume the puzzle away by restricting the
government set of policies or else generate the opposite, and empirically counterfactual, prediction--that
trade policy has a pro-trade bias (e.g. Grossman-Helpman AER 1994). We show that if the government's
objective reflects a concern for inequality, or diminishing marginal political support from factor owners,
then trade policy exhibits anti-trade bias. Importantly the mechanism that we analyze generates the anti-trade
bias independently of whether factors are specific or mobile across sectors. The mechanism also generates
an anti-trade bias between large countries even after they sign reciprocal trade agreements that eliminate any
terms-of-trade motivation for the use of trade protection.




The welfare maximizing policy for a small economy is free trade.  Yet, small economies rarely embrace
it.  A common explanation economists offer for this observation is that trade policy is chosen to achieve
objectives other than welfare maximization.  Positive tariffs in formal models are typically the result of
interplay of special interests and/or the government’s desire to redistribute income in favor of specific
groups including itself.
Nevertheless, as Rodrik (1995) points out, an important puzzle remains: why is trade policy typically
biased in favor of import-competing sectors and is consequently trade restricting rather than trade
promoting?
1  The question is particularly relevant in the context of small economies since they lack the
power to redistribute income in their favor through the optimum tariff.  Despite a substantial body of
literature on the endogenous determination of trade policy, to-date, we lack a systematic analysis of the anti-
trade bias in it.  Indeed, as Levy (1999) demonstrates, if certain neutrality assumptions are made, the current
leading political economy model, due to Grossman and Helpman (1994) (henceforth GH), predicts a pro-
trade bias in trade policy.
2
It is tempting to conjecture that the anti-trade bias in trade policy may be the result of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which tolerates tariffs more readily than export subsidies.  A
                                                
1 The anti-trade bias in developing countries is apparent from the observation that trade reform by them has
been followed by a sizable expansion of the volume of trade.  It is also illustrated by the focus of the
GATT/WTO negotiations on the removal of trade barriers rather than trade stimuli.  Agriculture in
industrial countries, which receives large subsides, offers a potential exception to the general trend but even
here it is perhaps fair to say that the net bias of the policy is against trade in the sense that the removal of all
interventions will lead to an expansion of trade.  Taking industrial goods separately, rough estimates of
tariffs and subsidies in the United States do point to an anti-trade bias.  Thus, the estimated total ad valorem
equivalent of the main tax incentives for US exporters, such as the Foreign Sales Corporation Tax, was
approximately 1% in 1996 (Desai and Hines 2000, p.34) whereas the ad valorem equivalent tariff was 2.2%
<www.usitc.gov>.
2 A closely related question, not discussed in this paper explicitly, concerns the relationship between import
penetration and the level of import protection.  Helpman (1997) demonstrates that when imbedded in the
"almost-partial-equilibrium" version of the specific factors model used in GH, a variety of political economy
models lead to the conclusion that import protection declines with import penetration.  Maggi and2
moment’s reflection shows, however, that this explanation is flawed.  For one thing, anti-trade bias in policy
predates GATT; indeed, one of the key original objectives of the latter was to eliminate this bias through
successive rounds of tariff-reduction negotiations among member countries.  Moreover, the rules against
export subsidies could have at most prevented the emergence of a pro-trade bias in trade policy and
supported a free-trade regime; they could not have resulted in a net anti-trade bias.  In order for the latter to
emerge, on net, political pressures had to favor protectionist policies.
In this paper, we offer a systematic formal analysis of the anti-trade bias in trade policy.  We depart
from the current dominant practice in the literature in two important respects.  First, instead of the GH
“almost-partial-equilibrium” model, we employ the more conventional general-equilibrium model.  This
switch has important implications.  In the almost-partial-equilibrium model, also called the “quasi-linear”
model, the numeraire good uses a generic factor of production, labor, and exhibits constant marginal utility
in consumption.  All non-numeraire goods, on the other hand, use labor and a sector-specific factor and
exhibit diminishing marginal utility in consumption.  These features imply that all substitution in production
and consumption following a change in relative prices takes place between the numeraire and non-numeraire
goods and none between any pair of non-numeraire goods.  This outcome makes the model unsuitable for
analyzing policies that involve redistribution including trade policy.
3   In contrast, in the conventional
general-equilibrium model we employ, substitution properties between two or more non-numeraire goods
are no different from those between the numeraire and non-numeraire goods.
Our second point of departure is to incorporate equity considerations into the government’s decision-
making process.  We assume that ceteris paribus, the government values greater equity in income
distribution and uses trade policy to achieve this objective.  Even though trade policy is not the first-best
                                                                                                                                                                
Rodriguez-Clare (2000) demonstrate that allowing for quotas and voluntary export restraints in addition to
trade taxes or assuming a positive cost of raising funds, it is possible to obtain the opposite result.
3 Thus, two of the authors who popularized this approach, Grossman and Helpman, themselves state, “In
models of economic policy, whether normative or positive, the most important drawback of quasi-linearity is
that it gives incomplete or implausible answers to distributional questions (…) In short, the assumption of
quasi-linearity makes the model unsuitable for analyzing distribution and transfer policies that are of the
essence in public finance and political economy.” Dixit, Grossman, Helpman (1997, p.754)3
instrument of achieving income equality, in the opinion polls, it continues to receive substantial public
approval at least in the United States [Freeman (2002)].  Provisions for adjustment assistance due to
dislocation following trade liberalization offer additional indirect evidence that income distribution
considerations influence trade policy.
The importance of the concern for inequality in developed countries is further supported by the
observation that import protection favors sectors with a large share of low-skill, low-wage workers.
4 Of
course, by itself, this evidence is also consistent with the alternative hypothesis offered by Magee et al
(1989): unskilled workers have a lower opportunity cost of lobbying and therefore demand higher
protection.  Therefore, to conclude in favor of the equity hypothesis, we must show that unskilled workers
demand no more protection than skilled workers.  The estimates of Goldberg and Maggi (1999, p.1152)
show that in the US unskilled workers demand less, not more, protection than skilled workers.  Therefore the
positive relationship between the share of low-skill low-wage workers and the level of protection is likely to
reflect the motive for redistribution/equity that we model.
5
The benchmark against which we compare our results is the trade-promoting bias in trade policy that
arises in the symmetric case in GH model as noted by Levy (1999).  To explain precisely the nature of this
bias, suppose there are two non-numeraire goods in the GH model.  Denoting them by 1 and 2, begin with
complete symmetry between them in consumption as well as production and assume their autarky prices
coincide with their respective world prices fixed at unity by the choice of units.  Next, adjust the
                                                
4 See for example Baldwin (1985) for evidence on the US and Ray (1981) for the US, Canada, UK,
Germany, Belgium, Italy, France and Japan and Lee and Swagel (1997) for a broader set of countries. This
and other evidence for the US lead Baldwin to conclude that "models that include behavior based either on
long-run self-interest or concern for the welfare of other groups and the state are also necessary to account
for the actions of voters and public officials." (1985, p.174) Dutt and Mitra (2002) find that lagged
inequality has a positive and significant effect on the tariff level for capital-abundant countries in a cross-
section. They find the opposite for labor-abundant ones.
5 More specifically Goldberg-Maggi regress a lobby organization variable, equal to one if the industry has
large political contributions and zero otherwise, on a number of industry characteristics including capital
stock, buyer and seller concentration and unionization. Even if we argue that unskilled workers are more
likely to be organized so that we should add the union and unskilled coefficients, 2.16 +2.59, and then
compare to the skilled labor coefficient, 22.34 we could still not reject the hypothesis that skilled labor
demands at least as much or more protection than unskilled unionized labor.4
endowments of factors specific to the goods in such a way that the output of good 1 contracts by 1 percent
and that of good 2 expands by the same percent.  This turns good 1 into an import good and good 2 into an
export good with net trade balance between them being zero at the free-trade equilibrium.  The numeraire
good remains non-traded.  Invoke now the GH lobbying model, which predicts a tariff on good 1 and export
subsidy to good 2.  Additionally, given the symmetry, the rate of import duty is lower than that of export
subsidy because the export sector is larger and the equilibrium level of protection is proportional to industry
output.  Therefore, exports of good 2 expand more than imports of good 1 contract.  In the new equilibrium,
the numeraire good is imported.  Thus, the volume of trade in the political equilibrium is larger than at the
free trade equilibrium. 
6
In the first part of this paper we show that the pro-trade bias in GH does not arise once we replace the
almost partial equilibrium framework by the conventional general equilibrium model. In fact we show that
even under perfect symmetry an anti-trade bias can arise in our general equilibrium framework.  Moreover,
if we assign the equity motive the central role in the determination of trade policy, we can show that there is
a quite general presumption in favor of the anti-trade bias in both the symmetric and asymmetric
equilibriums.  These results hold for specific-factors as well as Heckscher-Ohlin versions of the general
equilibrium model.
Some flavor for the mechanism underlying our results can be given as follows.  Consider first the
conventional sector-specific model within the GH political economy framework.  The first point to note is
that the symmetric equilibrium in this model can be constructed with just one numeraire and one (rather than
two) non-numeraire sector since each sector uses a sector-specific factor capable of lobbying for itself.
Moreover, by replacing the quasi-linear utility function by the conventional homothetic utility function, we
can also introduce symmetry on the demand side.
                                                
6 We alert the reader that in general the GH model does not rule out anti-trade bias in trade policy.  For
instance, if there is only one non-numeraire good, the only factor that lobbies is the one specific to this
sector.  Then the bias is pro-trade if this sector produces an exportable and anti-trade if it produces an
importable.5
Denoting the two sectors by 1 and 2 then, begin with complete symmetry across sectors.  This makes
the relative price of good 1 equal to 1 under autarky.  Assuming the initial world relative price to be 1 as
well, the country has no incentive to trade.  Given the GH political economy setup, trade policy is used to
redistribute income away from labor towards specific factors.  At the margin, this is achieved by moving
labor out of the sector where it enjoys a higher share in income to the one where it enjoys a lower share.
Given symmetry, under autarky, labor’s share in income is the same in the two sectors so that the
government has no incentive to move labor in either direction.
Now consider a small reduction in the price of good 1.  Assuming a free trade policy for now, the
change leads the country to import good 1 and export good 2.  Moreover, if the elasticity of substitution
between the factors (which is the same in the two sectors due to the assumed symmetry) is larger than 1, the
reduction in the relative price of good 1 lowers the share of labor in income in sector 1 and raises it in sector
2.  Therefore, at the free trade equilibrium, labor’s income share in sector 1 is lower than that in sector 2.  To
redistribute income away from labor and towards specific factors, the government has an incentive to move
labor out of sector 2 into sector 1.  The outcome is a protectionist policy.  Of course, if the elasticity of
substitution is smaller than unity, we obtain the opposite result: the government opts for an export subsidy.
In the knife-edge, Cobb-Douglas case, the policy is free trade.
Now introduce the equity objective.  Specifically, assume that ceteris paribus the government always
prefers a more equitable distribution among labor and owners of sector-specific factors to less equitable
distributions.  Again, begin with a fully symmetric equilibrium together with the assumption that the autarky
distribution of income among the three factors is entirely equal.  As in the previous example, let the world
price be the same as the autarky price in the country so that there is no incentive to trade.  Given the equal
distribution across factors, the government has no incentive to reallocate labor either way for redistributive
purposes.
Next, consider a small reduction in the world price of good 1.  The country now imports good 1 and
exports good 2.  In the absence of any intervention, the change is also accompanied by a decline in the share
of K1 (factor specific to sector 1) in the GDP and a rise in the share of K2 (the factor specific to sector 2) in6
GDP.  The share of labor in GDP may rise or fall; if it rises the proportionate increase in it is less than the
increase in the share of K2 and if it falls, the proportionate decline in it is less than the decline in the share of
K1.  As a result, in the free trade equilibrium, K2 ends up with the highest share, followed by labor and K1 in
sector 1 in that order.  The introduction of a tariff reverses some this loss in equity regardless of the elasticity
of substitution.  Therefore, the policy outcome is anti-trade regardless of the elasticity of substitution.
We demonstrate that with minor qualifications, alternative shocks such as a Hick-neutral technical
progress in sector 1 and a rise in the endowment of the factor specific to sector 2, which lead the country to
import good 1, are also accompanied by the adoption of a protectionist policy.  The results extend to a two-
country context even after we neutralize for the terms-of-trade motive for protection.  They also extend to
the Heckscher-Ohlin set-up as long as we maintain the assumption of symmetry and initial equal
distribution.
In the general case when the initial distribution of income is unequal, either pro- or anti-trade bias may
exist in trade policy.  Under the equity objective, we are able to establish a likelihood result, however.
Specifically, we show that the probability of a pro-trade bias in trade policy is necessarily lower than that of
an anti-trade bias in it.
In the remainder of this introduction, we offer a summary of the literature having a bearing on the
central question posed in this paper.  Olson (1983) argues heuristically that lobbies are more likely to
organize in the presence of negative shocks since these make the entry into the industry less attractive and
thus the investment in lobbying less prone to free riding. In so far as import-competing sectors are subject to
more frequent and larger negative shocks, this introduces a bias in favor of lobbying for tariffs.  The
argument raises two questions, however.  First, it is not obvious why import-competing sectors should be
subject to more frequent and larger negative shocks than export sectors.  Second, even if this is true, such
shocks make exit from the industry more likely as well and, thus, lower the expected value of the investment
in the lobbying activity.
A second set of explanations for the bias in favor of import protection can be given by first observing
that in the early stages of development, countries impose tariffs for revenue reasons or infant industry7
protection.  If governments then rely on a conservative social welfare function a la Corden (1974), which
places a negative weight on deviations from the status quo welfare of different agents, the bias in favor of
tariffs persists even if the need for tariffs as the instrument of revenue vanishes.  Alternatively, following
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), tariffs may persist despite the availability of alternative revenue-raising
instruments due to uncertainty about the identity of beneficiaries of trade liberalization.  Even though
liberalization is expected to benefit the majority, if the identity of some of the potential winners is not
known, liberalization may fail to materialize.  Yet another reason why welfare-enhancing liberalization may
fail to occur is that benefits may be concentrated and costs diffused so that the majority-voting rule results in
the defeat of liberalization.  While these approaches are undoubtedly illuminating, they are incomplete in
that they take the initial tariff itself as resulting from an exogenous constraint.
7
A final explanation is provided by Eaton and Grossman (1985) who use a combination of analytical and
numerical methods to demonstrate that an anti-trade bias is present when a government uses trade policy as
insurance to maximize expected welfare across two states of nature for the terms-of-trade (TOT). The role
for trade policy arises due to the absence of perfect insurance markets and ex-post differences in individual
welfare resulting from the irreversible allocation of capital between the two sectors based on ex ante TOT.
After the realization of the TOT, the capital owners in one sector are better off and, if they have diminishing
marginal utility of income, the government has an incentive to redistribute from them towards the capital
owners with the higher marginal utility. The insurance motive in Eaton-Grossman disappears if capital is
costlessly mobile, so the anti-trade bias suggested by their model would disappear in the long run. We view
the insurance motive for protection as more appropriate for explaining short-term contingent protection, e.g.
safeguards, rather than the long-term bias of trade policy towards import protection. As such the driving
mechanism in our model is motivated by redistribution and a concern for inequality rather than the insurance
motive. To make the distinction sharply our model has no uncertainty and the factor owners have constant
                                                
7 Strictly speaking, the last of these explanations can be applied to generate an anti-trade bias in trade policy,
as we will demonstrate below.8
marginal utility of income. Moreover, we allow the government to be influenced by both welfare and
political economy motives and show the anti-trade bias is present in the long-run, i.e. even if capital is
costlessly mobile across sectors.
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we outline the broad framework of our analysis. In
Section 3, we illustrate how the general equilibrium approach can reverse the pro-trade bias in the almost-
partial-equilibrium approach even if the political model is the same as that in GH.  In Section 4, we switch to
an objective function of the government that is strictly concave in the utilities of factor owners and
demonstrate that this leads to an anti-trade bias under a broad set of circumstances.  In Section 5, we
conclude the paper.
2  The Model
Bhagwati (1990) distinguishes two sets of forces that may make the choice of policy endogenous.  First,
rather than being a “puppet” in the hands of a welfare maximizing economist, the government may be “self-
willed” with its own objective function and power to determine policy.  In the models that follow this route,
there is no active feedback from the economic system to the government.  The models in the Niskanen
(1968) tradition in which bureaucrats maximize revenue for their own benefit and the Leviathan writings of
Brennan and Buchanan (1977) fall in this category.
Second, the government itself may be entirely passive, with the outcome determined by policy-
influencing games played by agents within a pluralistic political regime.  A good example of this approach is
the Findlay-Wellisz (1982) model of tariff seeking.  In their two-sector, specific-factors model, the specific
factor in the import-competing sector lobbies for tariff and that in the exportable sector against it.  Acting
purely as a clearinghouse, the government then supplies the tariff determined by the equilibrium of this
game.  Other contributions in this tradition include Rodrik (1986) and Panagariya and Rodrik (1993).
Bhagwati (1990) goes on to note that a realistic analysis of political economy must draw upon both of
these approaches.  On the one hand, governments have objectives that go beyond welfare maximization in
the traditional sense while, on the other, they respond to the attempts by economic agents to influence policy9
in their own interest within a “pluralist” political setting.  A good example in this class of models is the GH
political-economy model of tariff determination.  In their model, political agents maximize a weighted sum
of social welfare and political contributions using trade policy as an instrument while economic agents lobby
for tariff policies that would maximize their own welfare.
We consider two political-economy models of trade policy.  Both incorporate features of the “self-
willed” and “pluralist politics” models of policy determination.  Our first model resembles the GH model
with individual utilities entering linearly in the objective function of the incumbent politician.  Our second
model gives some play to the equity objective on the part of the government with individual utilities entering
log linearly into its objective function.  In both cases, economic agents are allowed to exert influence in
tilting the outcome in their favor.
In the interest of simplicity, we minimize the structure on the underlying lobbying game and rely,
instead, on reduced-form objective functions of government to represent the political economy side of the
model.  Among other virtues, this allows us to focus more fully on the structure of the trade model. Thus, we
derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the government to choose an import tariff versus an export
subsidy under alternative government objective functions and production structures.
We employ the standard specific factors model with two goods i = 1, 2.  Each good is produced using a
sector-specific factor, Ki, and a common factor, Li, called capital and labor, respectively.  Technology
exhibits constant returns to scale.  By appropriate choice of units, we set the world price of each good equal
to unity.  Trade policy takes the form of a trade tax or subsidy on good 1 at rate t so that the domestic price
of good 1 equals 1+t.  If good 1 is imported, a positive t implies a tariff and a negative t an export subsidy.
8
Under the usual assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns, the production decisions can be
summarized by the standard revenue function, R(1+t, 1; L, K1, K2), which is convex in the prices, concave in
factor endowments and linear homogeneous in each set of variables.  The partial derivatives of R(.) with
                                                
8 Strictly speaking, this is an import subsidy.  But by the Lerner Symmetry theorem, an import subsidy is
identical to an export subsidy.10
respect to price arguments give respective outputs and those with respect to endowments yield respective
factor prices as functions of goods prices and factor endowments.
There is specialization in the ownership of factors such that workers and owners of each specific factor






j respectively denote the quantities of goods 1 and 2 consumed by group j. The functional form for
U(.) is common to all groups and linear homogeneous in its arguments.
Given the above specification, we can summarize the consumption decisions of the jth group via the
expenditure function e(1+t, 1)U
j, where e(.) is concave and linear homogeneous in its arguments. Total
demand for each good in the economy can be obtained by summing across individual demands of different
factor owners.
A key issue concerns the disposal of tariff revenue.  It is evident that the rule governing this disposal
can have determining impact on the outcome.  In order to make this source of results as neutral as possible,
we will assume that tariff revenue is redistributed among factor owners in exact proportion to their earned
factor incomes.









∑ j = L, 1, 2,
where e1(.) and R1(.) represent the first partials of e(.) and R(.) with respect to the price of good 1.  It is then
immediate that e1(.)U
j represents the demand for good 1 by group j and therefore e1(.)∑U
j is the economy-
wide demand for the same good.  Moreover, since R1(.) is the economy-wide supply of good 1, the term in
parentheses on the right-hand side represents the import demand for good 1 (or export supply if negative).
Multiplying this term by the tariff rate t gives the total tariff revenue (export subsidy if good 1 is exported).
The term in square brackets, thus, represents the total income or GDP.  We use θ
j to denote the share of
                                                
9 Symmetrically, if the outcome is a subsidy, each factor owner bears a burden in proportion to its earned
income.11
factor j in earned income.  For example, θ
L = [RL(.)L]/R, where RL(.) is the partial derivative of R(.) with
respect to L and equals the wage rate.
Given the tariff rate t, we can solve the three equations embedded in (1) for the three utility levels.




R(.) - t.R (.)
U =    θ
e(.) - t.e (.)
j = L, 1, 2.
Given U
j, we can calculate the consumption quantities, which can be combined with the information on
outputs to calculate imports and exports.  The key question we address next, therefore, is how t is





where G(.) is concave and non-decreasing in its arguments.  In general, G(.) can be interpreted as a
political support function (Hillman 1982 and Long and Vousden 1991) resulting from the interaction of a
self-willed government and self-interested lobbies.  The tariff rate is then determined by maximizing G(.)
with respect to t subject to the three constraints embedded in (2).  Doing so and evaluating the resulting






   G (.)  θ
dt
 =     ∑
where θt
j denotes the partial derivative of θ
j with respect to t.   That is to say, the government can improve
upon the free-trade outcome by choosing a positive t provided the sum of the change in the factor share
weighted by the marginal contribution of the utility of the factor to the objective function is positive.  Note,
however, that the validity of this condition by itself does not guarantee positive protection and hence an anti-
trade bias in trade policy.  For a positive t implies an anti-trade outcome if and only if good 1 is the import
good.  In general, there is no guarantee that good 1 is the import good--an issue we address later in the
paper.
Presently, we note that since the shares of different factors in the total income must sum to unity,
equation (4) is equivalent to12
(5)
12
1L t 2L t t=0
t=0
dG
   (G -  G )  θ (G - G ) θ
dt
  =+   
If the marginal contribution of the utility of each factor to the government’s objective function is the
same, the right-hand side of (5) reduces to zero.  We immediately obtain the standard result that free trade
maximizes the government’s objective, which is equivalent to maximizing welfare in this case.
3  Linear Objective Function: No a priori Pro-trade Bias




G =  γ U ∑
In view of (5), the government sets a positive tariff if the following expression is positive:
(7)




   (-)   θ (-)   θ
dt
γγ γγ   =+   
If no lobbies were present and the government itself did not weigh the utility of a specific group more
heavily than others, the γ
j would be identical and the optimal policy will be non-intervention (i.e. free trade)
as noted at the end of the previous section.
As a benchmark, consider a special case where the effect of the tariff on the specific factor shares are
exactly offsetting, θt
1 = - θt
2 > 0.  In this case, the tariff will be zero if the government places a similar
weight on specific factor owners, independently of whether it is higher or lower than the weight placed on
labor since its share is constant. Trade policy has neither an anti nor a pro-trade bias. The government sets a
positive tariff if and only if good 1 is imported and γ
1 > γ
2: a hardly surprising outcome. So the question for
any specific model where the weights, γ, are endogenous and (6) is the reduced form government objective
is whether it can predict γ
1 > γ
2.
We now demonstrate that in general we do not require γ
1 > γ
2 to explain the observed anti-trade bias in
the policy.  Thus, consider the more general case when the labor share is not independent of the tariff.  For
expositional simplicity, focus on the case where lobbying pressure leads to a larger weight on the utility of13
the specific factors over labor as, for example, in GH.  The extension of the results to the general case is
straightforward as shown below. Setting γ
L = 1 and γ
1 = γ
2 = γ > 1, (7) reduces to
(8)
12 L
tt t = 0 t t = 0
t=0
dG




Thus, a positive t is chosen if and only if it increases the combined income share of specific factors or,
equivalently, reduces the income share of labor.
To proceed, we let w stand for the wage rate, p1 (= 1+t) for the price of good 1 and use a circumflex
over a variable to denote the proportionate change in that variable.  In addition, we denote by λLi (= Li/L) the
allocative share of labor in sector i, σi the elasticity of substitution between factors in sector i, θ
ii the share of
specific factor i in the income generated in sector i, eLi (= σi/θ
ii) the elasticity of demand for labor in sector i,
∆ (= λL1eL1 + λL2eL2) the economy-wide elasticity of demand for labor and µ (= p1R1/R) the share of sector 1
in national income.  We can then establish the following Lemma.
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To prove, note that according to (8), a positive t is chosen provided (θt
L)t=0 < 0. The share of labor in
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The last of these equalities immediately yields first part of Lemma 1.  The remaining part follows from the
standard expression for the effect of the price change on the wage rate in the specific-factors model.
10
Intuitively, the rise in the tariff rate alters labor’s share in income by increasing the wage income and
national income in terms of the numeraire good.  The proportionate increase in the wage income equals the
proportionate increase in the wage rate.  The proportionate increase in the national income due to a one
percent increase in the price of good 1 equals the initial share of good 1 in the national income.  If the former
increase is less than the latter, labor’s share in the national income declines.  This is precisely what Lemma 1
tells us.
11
We can now state the following proposition:





L. The government sets t > 0





  σ  <  σ  
θθ
To prove, we use the inequality involving the first and last terms in (11).  Substitute µ = p1R1/R, R =
p1R1 + p2R2, ∆ = λL1eL1 + λL2eL2 in these terms.  After cross multiplying, we have,
1 1 L1 L1 L2 L2 L1 L1 1 1 2 2 pR( λ e+ λ e) > λ e( p R + p R )
The first terms on each side is the same and therefore drops out.  Furthermore, since λLi = Li/L and eLi =
σi/θ
ji, the inequality reduces to
                                                
10 See for example Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan  (1998, p. 156).
11 Lemma 1 can be readily related to the result on the neoclassical ambiguity.  According to  Ruffin and
Jones (1977) the neoclassical ambiguity is ruled out if and only if the proportionate increase in the wage due
to a 1 percent increase in the price of a good exceeds the share of that good in labor’s total expenditure, say,
ψ.   If labor's expenditure share of good 1 is representative of the rest of the economy then under no trade it
must equal the share of good 1 in output, µ.  If good 1 is imported, we have ψ > µ.  Thus a sufficient though
not necessary condition for the sum of the specific factor shares to fall after a tariff is for the real wage to
increase in terms of the imported good, i.e. 
/\ /\




wL σ wL σ
>
pR θ pR θ
Defining wLi/piRi ≡ θ
Li  (i = 1, 2), and rearranging, we obtain condition (16).
Proposition 1 provides the condition under which the government sets t >0. The intervention favors the
sector with the lower ratio of income share of labor to that of the specific factor weighted by the elasticity of
substitution in the sector.  If the elasticities of substitution are identical across sectors, the condition simply
says that the sector with the lower income share of labor receives protection.  That is to say, given identical
elasticities of substitution, trade policy has the anti-trade bias provided labor’s income share in the import-
competing sector is less than that in the export sector.
When (16) holds the condition in (7) is strictly positive so we can find some γ
2 >γ
1 such that the
government still sets a positive tariff. That is the government may set a positive tariff even if it weights the
owners of capital in the export sector more highly than those in the import sector. The converse is also true
when (16) does not hold.
We now argue that in our general equilibrium setup there is no a priori pro-trade bias, unlike the
"almost-partial-equilibrium" setup in GH. In the latter model all organized specific factor owners receive
protection, both the ones in the import and export sectors (as long as all voters are not organized into
lobbies, p.845). The level of the tariff or export subsidy in GH is proportional to the level of production
relative to net imports. Specialization according to comparative advantage then implies that this level is
likely to be higher in the export sector and thus the model predicts that lobbying promotes trade, i.e. there is
a pro-trade bias.
To understand the role of the "almost-partial-equilibrium" setup and contrast it to ours, consider the
following. In the GH setup, when the ownership of factors is highly concentrated the benefit of a given
subsidy for a factor owner in the export sector is much higher than the cost of a comparable tariff in an
import good consumed by that factor owner. In our general equilibrium setup without a numeraire good
entering linearly in utility any increase in the protection of the import sector has the exact same effect as a
decrease in the protection of the export sector. So either one or the other will be protected. Which one gets16
the protection does not depend on industry size relative to net imports, as is clear from (16). It depends on
which good has the lower share of labor to specific factor income weighted by the elasticity of substitution.
The following two corollaries show that (16) implies no a priori pro-trade bias even in the symmetric case,
unlike GH. That is (16) can lead to a tariff or subsidy independently of the sector's output relative to net
imports. This suggests that the "almost-partial-equilibrium" setup is important in generating the pro-trade
bias.






production functions are of the Cobb-Douglas type. A country's trade policy has an anti-trade bias if and





The corollary follows directly from proposition 1 after imposing the constant production shares. The
intuition is straightforward.  The objective is to increase the combined income of specific factors beyond that
under free trade.  This is accomplished by shifting labor into the sector with higher income share of the
specific factor.  A tariff accomplishes this if the import good is associated with a higher income share of the
specific factor than the export good.
The strength of this prediction is its simplicity -- a tariff is implemented when the specific factors in the
import-competing sectors have higher income shares than in the exporting sectors.  This result is readily
translated in terms of factor endowments.  Thus, suppose that all countries have identical homothetic
preferences.  Then holding the labor endowment fixed, countries with smaller relative endowment of the
specific factor with higher income share (K1 in the case assumed in Corollary 1) than the rest of the world
will import the good using that factor and therefore exhibit anti-trade bias in their trade policies.
The income shares in the Cobb-Douglas case are determined entirely by technology.  If we assume
complete neutrality between sectors, we would have identical technologies across the sectors and the model
would predict zero tariff and thus neither pro- nor anti-trade bias in the policy.  More generally, allowing the
technologies to differ across sectors but constraining them to be similar across countries (up to some Hicks-17
neutral technology parameter) the corollary predicts that one set of countries will exhibit anti-trade bias and
the other set pro-trade bias.





L and the two sectors are
initially symmetric in preferences, endowments and CES production technology. After any endowment shock
that induces this small economy to import good 1 the government will set (i) t=0 if p
w=1 and σ>0; (ii) t>0 if
p
w<1 and σ>1 or p
w>1 and σ<1; and (iii) t <0 otherwise.
To prove, observe that symmetry implies that the autarky price is unity and the (sectoral) income shares
of specific factors, θ
11 and θ





2 the government sets a tariff of zero, according to (16). Now suppose
that K2 = sK1 and s>1 so the country imports good 1 and exports 2. For the CES technology, the capital
share in sector i is Ki
ε/(Ki
ε +Li
ε), where σ=1/(1-ε) and -∞ < ε <1.  Therefore, we can rewrite (16) as
(L1/K1)
ε< (L2/K2)
ε. The government sets a positive tariff if and only if sign(ε) (L1/K1) < sign(ε) (L2/K2).
When the world price is one labor moves to the sector with the higher capital-labor ratio until the capital-
labor ratios, and factor shares, are equalized. In this case the government sets t=0 for all σ >0.
Suppose now that the world price falls just below unity after the increase in K2.  The country continues
to import good 1 and export good 2.  Moreover, when σ > 1, the lower price of good 1 raises the income
share of production for K1
 and lowers that for K2 as labor moves to the export sector.  Given proposition 1,
this implies a tariff on good 1 to raise the joint share of specific factors in the total income.  Similarly we can
show that a tariff also results if σ<1 and the world price exceeds unity, but not by enough to reverse the
pattern of trade that results from the increase in K2.
12
The results in corollary 2 are summarized in figure 1, which depicts the case where home's autarky
price of good 1 relative to 2 exceeds unity reflecting the fact that home is relatively abundant in K2. Again,
for the most neutral of cases, similar technologies and world price normalized to one, there is no a priori bias
                                                




in trade policy in either direction. For the more general cases whether the government sets a positive tariff
depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution, not in any way on the size of the industry relative to net
imports. The bottom line is that the pro-trade bias in policy predicted by the "almost-partial-equilibrium"
models does not generalize once we move to the more general model.  If in addition we consider a non-
linear government objective we can go further and actually offer an explanation for the observed anti-trade
bias.
4  Non-linear Political Support and Anti-trade Bias
If the government objective function represents political support, it is reasonable to expect diminishing
marginal support in the utilities of various factor owners as in the original formulation by Hillman (1982).
Moreover, if the government's objective includes some concern for inequality, then diminishing marginal
social utility is more reasonable then the constant marginal social utility assumed in (6), since the latter does
not penalize large disparities in utility. As we argue in the introduction this appears to be a potentially
important determinant of the structure of tariffs in developed countries. More importantly, this is not an
innocuous assumption when trying to explain the bias of trade policy in redistributing income towards the
import sector factor owners, as we now show.
4.1  Anti-trade bias due to an inequality concern in a small economy
Suppose that G is strictly concave in the utility of each factor owner, which can reflect a concern for






g =  γ  ln U ∑
In view of (2), which implies U
j = (R/e)θ









t = 0 t=0
dg R(.) γ
 =   θ
dt e(.) θ
R(.) γγ γγ
             =     -  θ  +   -  θ
e(.) θθ θθ
 
   
   
   
   
∑
As before, it is useful to think of the γ
j as representing lobbying pressures.  Suppose first that these
pressures are absent and γ
j = 1 for all j.  This does not result in free trade, however.  Because the government
prefers a more equitable distribution and is denied the use of lump-sum taxes to affect redistribution, it still
chooses a t different from zero.  For example, a positive t is chosen provided the share of labor in income is
smaller than that of each specific factor and the increase in t reduces the share of each specific factor.  Trade
policy is used to redistribute income in favor of the initially “poor” factor.
Alternatively, consider the special case in which a change in t at t = 0 leaves the combined share of
specific factors in the total income unchanged.  In this case θt
1 = - θt







 =   -   θ
dt e(.) θθ
  
     
Thus, unlike the linear case, even if we have γ
1 = γ
2 and trade intervention is unable to redistribute income
between labor and specific factors, a non-zero t may be chosen.  The reason is that we still have the
equitable distribution objective at work and there are benefits to be had from redistributing income between
the two specific factors as long as θ
1 and θ
2 differ.
To get some further fix on the results, consider the special case in which preferences, technology and
the endowments of specific factors are entirely symmetric so that the autarky relative price of good 1 is
unity.  Suppose further that the world price of good 1 is less than unity.  The country then imports good 1
with labor reallocating from sector 1 to sector 2.  At the free trade equilibrium, we now have θ
1 < θ
2.  The
introduction of a tariff on good 1 redistributes income in favor of the factor specific to sector 1 and against
                                                                                                                                                                
13 With strictly concave objective function, the concentration of ownership of each factor makes difference
to the outcome.  We return to this issue in section 4.4 below but assume for now that either there is a single20
that specific to sector 2.  Assuming that these effects are exactly offsetting so that θt
1 = - θt
2 > 0, the tariff is
positive in the linear case if γ
1 > γ




2.  Since we have θ
1 < θ
2 at the
initial equilibrium, in the latter case, it is possible to have a positive tariff even when γ
1 < γ
2.  Thus,
protection can be the outcome even if the export industry has greater lobbying power.  We summarize this
result in
Proposition 2 (Linear vs. Log Linear Objective Function): Consider a small economy with two entirely
symmetric sectors in terms of endowments, technology and preferences.  Assuming that an import tariff
leaves the mobile factor's income share unchanged, a positive tariff is chosen if and only if γ
1 > γ
2 when the






2 when the government's objective is Σγ
jlnUj.  In the latter
case, since θ
1 < θ




Proposition 2 refers to an economy in which (i) the share of labor in income is invariant with respect to
the tariff rate, (ii) preferences, technologies, endowments and initial income shares are symmetric and (iii)
there is no inter-sectoral capital mobility. We now show the motivation for the anti-trade bias highlighted in
Proposition 2 is robust to relaxing each of these assumptions in the case when the initial autarky shares of
the three factors in the total income are equal.  Moreover, it also applies to a two-country model, predicting
anti-trade bias in both of them even after we neutralize for the TOT motive for tariffs through a cooperative
choice of the policy (section 4.2).  We then return to the more general case in which initial income shares
differ from one another (section 4.3).  Two additional issues we discuss relate to the implications of the
concentration of factor ownership (section 4.4) and the poverty-reduction motive for the anti-trade bias in
trade policy.
In this section, we limit ourselves to the case in which θ
j = θ in the initial, autarky equilibrium so that
according to (18) the government has no incentive to impose a tariff or export subsidy, unless it weights the
factor owners differently. We establish that if the government's objective is (17) and it places similar weight
                                                                                                                                                                
owner of each factor or the government takes the owners of each factor as a group in evaluating welfare.21
on all factor owners then any shock that leads the country to trade will also trigger a non-negative tariff
under at most additional mild restrictions on the elasticity of substitution in production.
Thus, suppose there is a reduction in the world price of good 1 leading the country to import this good.
The lower price depresses θ
1 and increases θ
2, a standard result in the specific factors model. Moreover, the
change in θ
2 is larger than that in θ
L, which in turn is larger than θ





1 and consequently 1/θ
1 -1/θ
L > 0 > 1/θ
2 -1/θ
L. According to (18), the government chooses a
positive tariff if θt
1 is positive and θt
2 is negative. Since a positive tariff on good 1increases the domestic
price of that good it has precisely that effect.
Next, suppose there is an increase in K2.  This leads the country to export 2 and import 1. It also
increases θ
L as labor becomes relatively scarce and moves to sector 2, which in turn implies that θ
1 falls.
Moreover, if capital and labor exhibit some substitution (the precise condition is σ > ½) then the share for





L and the government sets a positive tariff.
Finally, a positive Hicks-neutral technological shock in sector 2 also leads the country to export good 2
and import good 1.  It increases the share of labor, as it becomes more productive in sector 2, and induces
some workers to move out of sector 1 thus reducing θ
1. The labor movement partially offsets the initial
increase in wages due to the technical change. This implies that θ
L does not rise by as much as θ
2. The share
θ
2 increases both because of the technical change and the increased labor supply to sector 2. Thus after a
positive Hicks-neutral technological shock in sector 2 we have 1/θ
1 -1/θ
L > 0 > 1/θ
2 -1/θ
L and thus the
government will set a positive tariff.
We summarize these results and their straightforward generalizations to situations involving differential
lobbying powers of different factors in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Inequality concern and anti-trade bias): Consider a country that is a small replica of the rest
of the world with two initially symmetric sectors in terms of endowments, technology and preferences, such
that θ
j = θ for all j. Suppose also that the government's political support function is log linear.  Any shock22
that causes the country to import good 1 leads to a positive tariff if σ ≥1/2 and γ
j =γ. The same result also


















In our discussion we assumed that the government placed equal weight on all factor owners, for
expositional simplicity. However, the result holds more generally as is clear from (18). Importantly our
result holds even if the government places the least weight on the specific factor owners in the import sector.
The condition on σ is only required if we consider the change in factor endowments as the source of trade,
and even then it is not necessary, but sufficient.  Thus, the anti-trade bias result in proposition 2 for a
government with an inequality concern holds even when labor’s share is allowed to respond to the change in
the tariff and for a number of different shocks that induce a country to trade.
4.2  Anti-trade bias in a two-country model with reciprocal trade liberalization
Thus far we focused on a small economy. We now confirm that the anti-trade bias resulting from a
loglinear political support function extends to the case of large economies, even if governments cooperate on
setting tariffs, which neutralizes the TOT motive. That is we show that in the spirit of Propositions 2 and 3,
both governments choose positive tariffs when their objective is (17). This is true when the governments
value all factors equally, value import capital owners more than the remaining factor owners and even in
some cases when the welfare of the capital owners in the export sector is more heavily weighted than that in
the import sector.
Consider a world with two countries, home and foreign, initially identical and with complete symmetry,
across preferences, technology and endowments. The equilibrium relative price of good 1 is then unity.
Because of the initial symmetry there is no motive for trade. The symmetry also implies that income shares
are identical for all factors so there is no motive for a tariff or subsidy if the government's objective is (17)
and all factors are equally weighted.
Next, suppose we transfer δ units of K2 from foreign to home and δ units of K1 from home to foreign.
Given the symmetry in technology between the two sectors, the integrated equilibrium is unchanged and the
free trade price is again be unity with home exporting good 2 and importing good 1. Because the increase of23
K2 is exactly offset by the reduction in K1 and the free trade price remains unity, the real wage and thus total
labor income is unchanged at that price. With the price and wage unchanged, the real return to capital in
each sector is also unchanged. Therefore we have θ
2>θ
L>θ
1 at home and θ
1*>θ
L*>θ
2* in foreign at t=t
*=0.
An anti-trade bias in a model with two large economies is readily generated from the optimum tariff
argument. To ensure that our result is not driven by this motive, we show that the cooperative tariff chosen
by each country is positive in the present case.  Since the countries are symmetric, allowing them to set the
tariff cooperatively internalizes any TOT motive for a tariff. The symmetry also ensures that whatever, non-
prohibitive, equilibrium tariffs they choose are identical, leaving the final world price at unity.
The joint objective function for two cooperating governments with a political support function such as
(17) is:
(19) g





In principle, joint maximization may require transfers between countries but given the symmetry, this will
not happen ex post in the present case.  Taking the FOC with respect to t and t* we would have two








The first set of terms in this condition, Ut
j/ U
j, is exactly the same as (18) if evaluated at t=0 and if the world
price is constant. So, if this were the only term then (18) would again determine whether a positive tariff or
subsidy is chosen. The second set of terms in (20) internalize the cost of home's tariff on foreign. We know,
however, that the symmetric equilibrium implies an unchanged free trade price. Moreover, the only effect of
the domestic tariff on the foreign factor's utility occurs via changes in the world price. Therefore Ut
j*=0 for













We are now in a position to state the following result:24
Proposition 4: (Inequality concern and anti-trade bias: 2-country model) Consider a two-country model with
identical preferences and technologies for both goods such that if they shared the same endowments no
trade would occur and θ
j = θ for all j. Suppose that the actual endowments for home and foreign are
symmetric: L=L
* and K2= K1
*= K2
*+2δ= K1+2δ, where δ>0, so that home imports good 1 and exports 2 at
the free trade price of unity. The cooperative tariff jointly set by home and foreign, t=t
*, is positive if the
governments have identical loglinear political support functions and γ
j =γ.  The same result also holds true


















4.3  Anti-trade bias due to an inequality concern: initially asymmetric income distributions
In the preceding, we have deliberately focused on income distributions that are initially symmetric to
demonstrate the presence of an anti-trade bias in trade policy under entirely neutral conditions. We now
show that the anti-trade bias is robust to other initial income distributions.  In particular, we show that if all
initial factor owner's joint income distributions have the same probability of occurring and the government
has a concern for inequality then a positive tariff will result with a probability greater than an export subsidy
once a country starts trading. To do this we focus on a more general version of the small economy. We place
no restrictions on the initial distribution of income in the small economy or on the ROW and introduce trade
through a reduction in the trading costs.
International trading costs play an important role in limiting the volume of trade even today. These
costs may arise due to information barriers, transport costs, administrative procedures, product-standards and
of course trade restrictions. Reductions in these costs, due for example to technological improvements and
multilateral trade liberalization, have been an essential driving force for the integration of many economies
in the world trading system. Thus, any good explanation for an anti-trade bias and the effects of increased
import penetration must consider these large reductions in trading costs.
14
                                                
14 Hummels (2001) reports the trends in international transport costs while Limão and Venables (2001) offer
evidence on the effect of transport costs on the volume of trade. Venables and Limão (2002) model the
effects of transport costs on the pattern of trade.25
Let us assume that for each unit of good i arriving at destination, τi units must be shipped where τi >1.
We can then interpret τ
i-1 as the tariff per unit or the Samuelson iceberg trading cost. Suppose that the
relative price of good 1 in the rest of the world is p
w.  For each unit of good 1 shipped by the rest of the
world, home receives 1/τ1 unit.  Moreover, for each unit of good 2 delivered to the rest of the world, it must
ship τ2 units of good 2.  Thus, the effective relative price of good 1 facing home in the world market is
p
wτ1τ2.  The small economy will then import good 1 only if p
d > τ2τ1
 > 1.  Alternatively, the economy export
good 1 if p
d < 1/τ2τ1





Consider now a small economy with some endowment, technology and preference structure different
along at least one dimension from the rest of the world.  Let good 1 denote the good that the economy would
import in the absence of trading costs and assume that these costs are initially sufficiently large to prevent
any trade. The simplex (equilateral triangle) in figure 2 shows all possible initial income distributions for
home. The vertices S1, S2, SL represent the extreme distributions with all income going to K1, K2 and L,
respectively.  Along a segment such as S1S2, the share of the factor with unit share at the opposite vertex
(labor) is 0.  As we move along S1S2 from left to right, the share of K1 declines linearly from 1 to 0 and that
of K2 rises from 0 to 1.  Along any line parallel to S1S2 (not shown), the share of the factor with unit share at
the opposite vertex (labor) is constant and increases as we move the line closer and closer to the vertex until
it reaches 1 at SL.  As we move from left to right along such a line, the share of K1 falls and that of K2 rises.
Along a segment such as SLS'L, where S'L is the midpoint of S1S’1, the share of labor declines and those of
K1 and K2 rise monotonically with θ
1 = θ
2 as we move from SL to S'L.  At midpoint S, all factors have equal
shares. Analogous interpretations apply to S1S'1 and S2S'2.  The center point, S, represents the symmetric
distribution already analyzed.
Remembering that the small country under consideration imports good 1 by assumption and if all
lobbies are equally effective, according to (18), θ
2 ≥ θ
L ≥ θ
1 is sufficient but not necessary to give rise to a
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non-negative tariff.  The triangle S1S'1S2 defines θ
2 ≥ θ
L and triangle S2S'2SL defines θ
L ≥ θ
1. Therefore in a
trading equilibrium any distribution inside triangle S2SS'1 necessarily yields a positive tariff. Conversely, an
export subsidy results if the post-trade distribution is in triangle S1SS'2. We can further note that as we
approach any point of specialization in sector 2, for example point S'1, the first term in (18) becomes
arbitrarily large. Since that term as well as θt
1 are positive we can find shares such that (18) remains positive
even when θ
L > θ
2. This implies that all distributions in the shaded area contained in the triangle SLSS'1 also
entail a positive tariff if γ
j=γ.
15 Similar arguments justify why the shaded combinations along the curve that
connects S and S2 also surely entail a positive tariff.
Using figure 2 we can confirm proposition 3 when home and ROW are initially identical, the shares are
identical and there are no trade costs. Symmetry means that we start at S and there is no trade. If there is an
improvement in the TOT faced by the economy, a reduction in p
w in the case of proposition 3, then the
country imports 1. Moreover the share of K2 increases by more than the labor share and the share of K1 falls.
Thus we must end up at a point inside the triangle S2SS'1 and a positive tariff follows if all lobbies are




such that a positive tariff is also set.
We can also confirm proposition 4 when γ
j=γ. The initial equilibrium, when countries are identical, is at
S. After the increase in K2 and reduction in K1 at home there is no change in θ
L, an increase in θ
2 and a
decrease in θ
1. Thus the movement is along a horizontal line through S towards the right, the area that surely
yields a positive tariff. For foreign we have the opposite movement, which also necessarily entails a positive
tariff since foreign exports good 1.
Let's now consider I in Figure 3, a non-symmetric initial distribution. Rule out the deployment of a
domestic policy instrument to alter this asymmetric distribution.  If trading costs are sufficiently high, the




1.  Further reductions in trading
                                                
15 The shape of the shaded area as we approach point SL is explained by the fact that as θ
2 itself also27
costs result in a commensurate reduction in p
d and the country begins to export 2 and import 1 (or vice-versa
if we had labeled the goods such that p
d < p
w under autarky).
The fall in p
d lowers θ
1 and raises θ
2.  Since the movements along ∆θ
2 = 0 (or any line parallel to S1SL)
imply no change in the share of K2, the change is constrained to movements in the direction of S2 spanned
by ∆θ
2 = 0 in Figure 3. The fall in θ
1 means that we must move in the opposite direction of S1, so towards S2,
in any direction spanned by the line ∆θ
1 = 0. The share of labor increases relative to that of K1 so the
movement must be in the direction of SL as spanned by ∆θ
1 = ∆θ
L. The value of the change in the labor share
is not as large as that of K2 so the final constraint is for the movement to be in the direction of S2 , in any
direction spanned by the line ∆θ
2 = ∆θ
L.
Thus from some initial distribution such as I, a trade inducing shock leads to a movement towards a
distribution within the shaded cone in figure 3. Comparing with figure 2 we can see that a sufficiently large
shock always exists such that a positive tariff will be chosen once the country has a motive to trade. This is
obviously the case if trading costs fell to zero and at p
w the small economy specializes in and exports good 2.
However, the shock need not cause specialization, it must only entail a sufficient reduction in the import
sector's income share, as is clear from the shaded area in figure 2 that leads to t>0.
16
The general anti-trade bias due to an inequality concern is now clear. If any initial distribution of
income is equally likely then the probability of θ
2 ≥ θ
L ≥ θ




reductions in trading costs, such as the ones observed over the last 50 years, induce the country to import
good 1 and imply that the probability of θ
2 ≥ θ
L ≥ θ
1 is higher than that of θ
1 ≥ θ
L ≥ θ
2. Thus we can state the
following.
Proposition 5: (Inequality concern and anti-trade bias: asymmetric distributions) Consider a small 2-sector








1) so it does
                                                                                                                                                                
approaches zero it becomes increasingly difficult to find θ
L > θ
2 such that (18) remains positive.28
not trade initially. The government has a loglinear political support function and γ
j=γ. If any initial
distribution of income is equally likely then there always exists some reduction of the trading costs, τ
i, such
that the probability of a government setting a positive tariff is higher than that of it setting an export subsidy
in a trading equilibrium. There always exists a p
w such that the probability of a positive tariff is one even if
the small economy is not specialized.





a consequent increase in θ
2 and a decrease in θ


















j=γ the government necessarily sets a
positive tariff if good 1 is the import good and one of the inequalities is strictly valid. Conversely it
necessarily sets a subsidy if θ
1 ≥ θ
L ≥ θ
2. Thus there exists some reduction in trading costs such that the
probability of a government necessarily setting a positive tariff is higher than that of it necessarily setting an
export subsidy in a trading equilibrium. If at p
w the economy were almost fully specialized in 2 then θ
1→0
and (18) would become arbitrarily large and positive. The government would then set a positive tariff with a
probability one.
Thus, the observed fall in trading costs can justify a higher frequency or more pronounced negative
shocks to the price of an economy's imported good. When coupled with the government's concern for
inequality we end up with a trade policy with an anti-trade bias.
17  This conclusion is consistent with the
historical observation, noted by O'rourke and Williamson (2000, pp 113-117), that reductions in trading
costs during 19
th century that led to the opening of the economies of Australia Canada, Europe and Latin
                                                                                                                                                                
16 Note that if we chose I closer to S1 then ∆θ
1 = ∆θ
L 
 would cross S1S2. This does not invalidate our result
because  along S1S2 the labor share is zero. This is not an equilibriun since labor is an essential factor in the
poduction of 1 and 2 and either of the two goods is always produced.29
America were also accompanied by increased tariffs in those countries.  For example, they write on p. 113,
"The most common European response to globalization was to protect agriculture. Declining transport costs
typically provoked offsetting tariff policies--designed to compensate those whose interests were damaged by
steamship and railroad--rather than structural adjustment policies like education and retraining."  In the same
vein, they write on p. 117, "While the third quarter of the nineteenth century saw an easing of protection in
Latin America, tariffs rose again in the final quarter."
4.4  Extension to the Heckscher-Ohlin model
The specific factors model is best suited for an analysis over the medium-run. In the long run, if the
import sector capital owners were indeed worse off they would move their capital. This suggests that in the
long run the inequality concern may disappear as a source of anti-trade bias. We now argue that this is not
the case--an objective function such as (17) can explain the anti-trade bias even if capital mobility is perfect
across sectors as in the HO model.
To illustrate, consider a small economy with identical preferences over two goods, equal initial
endowments of labor and capital and symmetric production functions with a constant capital share θ
k<0.5 in
good 1 and 1- θ
k in good 2. If the rest of the world has identical preferences and capital to labor ratio there is
no trade and also no motive for the government to set a tariff.
After an increase in capital the country will import the labor-intensive good, labeled good 1. Since the
country is small the world price remains unchanged and so do the wage and rental rates (provided the
country does not specialize). The increase in capital implies an increase in national income but the labor
supply and wage remain unchanged so the labor’s share in the national income declines and capital's
increases. If the government's objective is given by (6), i.e. if it weights the utility of factor owners linearly
                                                                                                                                                                
17 Note that this argument is valid around the initial situation that we derive around the free trade point. It
does not imply, however, that reductions in trading costs will uniformly lead to higher tariffs. It is possible at
low enough trading costs further reductions lower the optimal tariff chosen for redistribution purposes.30
then it chooses free trade if γ
k=γ
L. However, if the government has an inequality concern, as reflected in
(17), then the reduction of the labor income share induces it to redistribute towards labor.
18
This redistribution requires an import tariff to raise the price of the labor intensive good, which is
imported. Evidently if labor is relatively more effective in lobbying then capital, i.e. γ
L > γ
K, then the
government has an added motive to chose an import tariff. More importantly, even if γ
L < γ
k, the government
may choose a positive tariff.  Note that in our example home becomes relatively capital abundant and so the
argument is broadly compatible with the pattern of protection in the US if we interpret capital to include
human capital so that labor represents unskilled labor.
 19
To conclude, the inequality concern holds a potentially important role in explaining the anti-trade bias
of trade policy. The very motive that causes a country to trade provides the government with a motive for
redistribution, which reduces trade.  Thus holds true for both workhorse models of trade policy, the specific
factors and HO model.
4.5  Concentration of ownership and anti-trade bias
According to Olson (1965) higher concentration of factor ownership reduces the incentive for free
riding thus minimizing the collective action problem inherent in lobbying activities. This theory implies that
the more highly concentrated industries receive more trade protection. However, the empirical evidence is at
best mixed. Baldwin (1985) finds that industry concentration is insignificant in explaining the level of
protection in the US whereas Treffler (1993) finds that seller concentration has a positive and significant
effect.
20 We provide an argument that explains why high concentration of factor ownership in a particular
sector can have a negative effect on the equilibrium level of protection for that sector, thus, potentially
                                                
18 It is readily shown that the first-order conditions in the HO model lead to an outcome similar to that in
equation (10).
19 If in our experiment we had increased labor instead of capital then the government would redistribute
towards capital owners. Since the labor abundant country imports the capital intensive good, 2, the
redistribution would again entail an import tariff.
20 A number of other authors have found evidence for and against the theory, Rodrik (1995, p. 1481).31
explaining the mixed evidence. More importantly, for our purpose, our argument implies that if the
concentration of factor ownership is relatively higher in the export sector and the government's objective
includes a redistribution motive then it pursues a policy with an anti-trade bias.
Consider the implication of the logic of collective action on the trade bias of trade policy. If the
concentration of ownership of the specific capital in the import were always higher than in the export sector
then the theory predicts an anti-trade bias, assuming that labor ownership is the most dispersed. However,
there is no a priori reason to believe that ownership is more concentrated in the import sector. In fact, there
is ample firm level evidence that export firms are larger than the average firm. At least for this reason, factor
ownership is relatively more concentrated in the export sector than in the import-competing sector. In this
case the logic of collective action predicts a trade policy with a pro-trade bias--the more highly concentrated
exporting industries would be more successful in lobbying and thus obtaining export subsidies.
Thus far we have aggregated different agents within each group and defined the government's objective
over the utility of the group, U
j. When the government's objective is linear this has no important implication
since the utility of each of the n
j identical agents in group j is simply u
j = U
j/n
j, as is clear from (2). So,
defining G over the individual agents would lead to the exact same expression as (6) and different factor
ownership concentration has no effect on whether a tariff or import subsidy is chosen.
If the government's objective includes an inequality concern then the concentration of factor ownership
becomes important. To see this let us first assume that all factor owners are equally effective in lobbying in
order to neutralize Olson's demand side argument. When inequality is a concern there is a natural
interpretation of the weights γ




j/n. This interpretation arises simply because the objective of a government with an inequality concern is
well represented by a geometric average of each individual's utility, where each is given an identical weight,
1/n, if it is as effective in lobbying as others.
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Now consider an initial situation in the specific factors formulation of our model where the factor









according to (18), the government sets t=0. Now, for a fixed level of the endowments, redistribute capital
away from some owners in the export sector towards others in their own group. Simultaneously redistribute
all the capital in the import sector among the existing owners in that sector and the "expropriated" owners in
the export sector. Because all individuals are assumed to have identical and homothetic preferences this
change in ownership does not alter anything in the economic equilibrium, i.e. in the absence of government
intervention. Importantly, the aggregate factor shares remain unchanged. However, the concentration of









L. According to (18) the government sets a positive tariff now that the concentration in the import
sector has fallen below that of the export sector.
If we believe that the government objective reflects an inequality concern then it is natural to interpret
the weights γ
j as being proportional to the share of the group in the population. In this case the prediction is
that a higher concentration of ownership of factor j relative to a factor i ≠ j makes the government less likely
to enact a policy that increases the share of j and reduces the share of i. This supply side effect does not
nullify the theoretical argument on the demand side of protection that concentration in ownership facilitates
lobbying and thus the implementation of a policy that favors the concentrated group. Taken together the two
arguments can account for the mixed empirical evidence on the effect of factor ownership concentration on
trade protection.
21
                                                
21 In the simple example we use the number of owners in the export sector after the redistribution of capital
is lower than in the import sector. So the prediction in this case is similar to the one in Caves (1976) where
industries that command more votes obtain more protection. However, empirically we can distinguish our33
4.6  Anti-trade bias due to a poverty reduction concern
The anti-trade bias results in the previous sub-sections extend to other government objective functions,
such as an extreme case where the government's objective is simply to improve the condition of the worse
off factor owners. Although such an objective is insufficient to explain the structure of protection it does
appear to be quite important in justifying the finding that protection in the US and the EU tend to be highest
in sectors with low wage and low skill workers. Suppose that is the case and the government objective can




The government will now chose a positive tariff if it increases the income share of the group that is
worst off under the free-trade equilibrium. We can use the simplex in figure 4 to illustrate this. The darker
shaded area represents the distributions for which the specific factor owners in the import sector, 1, have the
minimum share. Those are the distributions for which the government with objective (22) surely sets a
positive tariff. Conversely the lighter shaded are represents the area where it surely sets a subsidy. If the
distribution lies in the lower unshaded triangle, where labor has the lowest share, then it sets an import tariff
if and only if the condition in (16) does not hold, i.e. θt
L>0.
Starting from a non-trading equilibrium at S any shock that induces trade increases the share of
exporters, reduces that of importers and does not leave workers worse off than capital owners in the import
sector. Thus the resulting distribution is in the triangle on the right in figure 4 and entails a positive tariff.
More generally, we can start from any distribution and a TOT improvement leads to a movement towards
the area where t>0 (see figure 3 for the direction of change) so a proposition analogous to proposition 5
holds when the government objective is absolute poverty reduction.
It is also straightforward to show that a result analogous to proposition 4 for the two-country model
holds where both countries protect their respective import sectors. The simple example for the HO model
                                                                                                                                                                
model from that in Caves by noting that our result also holds if there are equal number of voters but capital
ownership is more concentrated in the export sector, e.g. because there is more capital in that sector.34
also produces an anti-trade bias when the objective is (22). The intuition for all these is basically the
following. The very shock that causes countries to trade tends to also reduce the need for an export subsidy
if the motive is a redistribution or poverty reduction one. This occurs because that very shock immediately
improves the welfare of the export factor owners and lowers that of the owners of specific factors in the
import sector.
5  Conclusion
In his review of trade policy Rodrik (1995) concludes that one of the main puzzles of trade policy is
why trade policy typically favors import-competing sectors and is consequently trade restricting rather than
trade expanding.  Levy (1999) points out that, ceteris paribus, the leading political economy model of tariff
policy, due to Grossman and Helpman (1994), predicts a pro-trade bias in trade policy.  As we noted in the
introduction, this prediction stands in contrast to the reality, which is characterized by an anti-trade bias in
both small and large economies.  The central question addressed in this paper therefore is how do we explain
the anti-trade bias in trade policy, especially in small economies that do not have the terms of trade motive
to restrict trade?
Our investigation proceeds along two lines.  First, we replace the almost-partial-equilibrium model
commonly employed these days including by Grossman and Helpman by a more conventional two-sector
general-equilibrium model.  This modification by itself is sufficient to eliminate any presumption in favor a
pro-trade bias in trade policy.  Using the same political economy model as in Grossman and Helpman, we
are able to show that if the two sectors are entirely symmetric in both consumption and production and the
elasticity of substitution between factors exceeds unity, the outcome is protection rather than export subsidy.
Our second line of investigation proceeds along an alternative political-economy model.  We replace
the GH linear government objective function by one that is strictly concave in the utilities of factor owners.
This feature allows us to generate a strong presumption in favor of anti-trade bias in trade policy.  We are
able to generate this presumption in small economies as well as large ones even when the latter set tariffs
cooperatively so that the terms of trade motive for tariffs is absence.35
The anti-trade bias in trade policy due to equity concerns may have interesting implications for
political-economy analyses in other areas.  For example, they may influence external-tariff setting during the
formation of PTAs. To offset the negative effect of tariff preferences on importers, the government may
choose to set its non-preferential tariffs higher than they would otherwise.36
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Fig 1: Equilibrium tariff: linear government objective
(CES production)
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Notes: CES with σ1=σ2; p=p1/p2. Equal marginal valuation for specific factors Gk1
 = Gk2> Gl, tariff signs reverse if Gk2
= Gk1< Gl.. In this example we assume that K2>K1 such that P
aut >1 and home imports 1.
Fig 2: Sufficient conditions for an anti-trade and pro-trade bias in trade policy
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Fig 3: Effect of a TOT improvement on some pre-trade income distribution I
SL 
S1  S2 
S'L 




















Fig 4: Sufficient conditions for anti-trade and pro-trade bias
(Government’s objective Min U
j, equal lobbying strength)
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